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DISRAELI AND THE EASTERN QUESTION:
DEFENDING BRITISH INTERESTS
By Caroline A. Reed
The Eastern Question concerned Europe for the better part of 500
years, but it reached crisis points several times during the 19th century. The
deterioration of Turkey, the creeping advance of Russia into the Balkans and
Central Asia, and the creation of an alliance between Russia, Germany, and
Austria-Hungary were all issues contained in the Eastern Question of the
1870s. All three of these issues threatened Britain’s goals of securing India
and maintaining a balance of power between the major powers on the
European continent. Therefore, in dealing with the Eastern Question, Prime
Minister Benjamin Disraeli pursued a course that kept Russia out of India and
reasserted British power relative to the rest of the European Continent.
An understanding of events in the 1870s requires knowledge of the
Eastern Question. According to historian J. A. R. Marriott, there were six
main underlying factors involved in the Eastern Question.1 The principal
issue was the effect of the Ottoman Empire’s deterioration on the major
European powers. The second major issue was the boundaries and ethnic
makeup of the Balkan states like Serbia and Bulgaria located within the
Ottoman Empire. A portion of the Ottoman Empire was located in Europe,
which meant that many of the people in the Balkans were Christians and
therefore persecuted by the Ottoman Muslims.2 Third, control of the Black
Sea, particularly the Dardanelles and Constantinople, often caused conflict
between the Russians, Austro-Hungarians, and Ottomans. The Ottomans
continued to control Constantinople, which benefitted Britain since the
Ottoman territory provided a buffer between Russia and India. Russia and
Austria-Hungary posed another problem for the powers, for both countries
wanted access to the sea. Russians and Austro-Hungarians also had ties to
different Balkan states that were both religious and ethnic in nature.3 The
Russian government, in particular, had to consider its subjects’ panslavism
and sympathy for the Orthodox Christians.4 Marriott says that the sixth factor
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is “the attitude of the European powers in general, and of England in
particular, towards all or any of the questions enumerated above.”5
Towards the end of the 19th century, the makeup of the European
continent began to change. The Franco-Prussian War left France weak while
Germany experienced a surge in power after finally unifying in 1871.
Beginning in 1870, the leaders of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary
made a series of state visits to each other’s countries to confirm their similar
foreign policy positions and a collective need to follow the same policies.
This unofficial alliance, called the dreikaiserbund (“three emperor bond”),
represented a return to the alliance systems in Europe.6 The dreikaiserbund
concentrated power on the continent in those three countries, leaving France,
Italy, and Britain without allies to counter them. On the British side, Disraeli
returned to the office of Prime Minister in 1874 intent on reasserting Britain’s
dominance on the European stage. Disraeli accused William Gladstone and
his Liberal government of being inactive and isolationist because of
Gladstone’s “failure to mediate in the Franco-Prussian war, [or] to prevent
the Russian denunciation of the Black Sea clauses.”7 One of Disraeli’s
biographers, Georg Brandes, went so far as to say that these supposed
blunders “made England an object of ridicule to every European state.”8
Disraeli considered foreign policy to be “the most important and fascinating
task of the statesman,” so he resolved to pursue a more aggressive, proempire course.9 In Disraeli’s own words, “what our duty is at this critical
moment is to maintain the Empire of England.”10
Britain also had to keep events in Central Asia in mind. Any threat
to India could not be ignored because it was the centerpiece of the British
Empire. While most countries were afraid of an invasion on home soil,
Britain instead worried about an invasion in India.11 To the British statesmen
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of the 1870s, Russia was the biggest threat because of its expanding territory,
economy, and population. Russia’s expansion into Afghanistan threatened
the northwest frontier of India.12 During the 1800s, Russia had steadily
advanced her territory in the Far East and Central Asia. China and
“disunited, semi-barbarous states” in the Middle East did not put up much of
a fight so it had been fairly easy for the Russians to expand as far south as
Afghanistan.13 Neither Russia nor Britain controlled Afghanistan officially,
but this mountainous region separated Russian forces from India. However,
Britain was more afraid of Russian influence rather than an actual physical
attack. The British feared that it would be very easy for Russia to incite an
insurrection among the Indian troops. 14 In fact, by 1870 the Russian generals
located in Central Asia began ingratiating themselves with the Amir of
Afghanistan. The British followed suit and so the Amir felt caught between
the two countries. Gladstone’s Liberal government, however, refused to
promise military aid to the Amir in the case of a Russian attack and so by the
time Disraeli came to power, the Amir was leaning more towards the
Russians.15
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In reality, Russia did not have the ability to finance development in
its outer fringes such as Afghanistan. Therefore, events in Afghanistan did
not matter to Russia to the extent that they mattered to Britain.16 The Russian
government made repeated promises not to advance farther or threaten
India.17 However, Russian generals in Central Asia often made territorial
advances that were not sanctioned by the government, which undermined
their promises. St. Petersburg’s lack of apparent control over their generals
made Britain and Disraeli nervous. 18 The Russian threat in Central Asia,
combined with the age-old worry of Russia’s quest for Constantinople, a
worry made more tangible by the Balkan Crisis, affected the way Disraeli
handled the coming crises of the Eastern Question.
Beginning in 1875, it became apparent that the Eastern Question was
causing another crisis when several revolts broke out in Bosnia and spread
quickly to Herzegovina and Serbia. The uprising broke out for several
reasons, all of which pointed to weakness and gross mismanagement on the
part of the Ottoman government. The Ottomans had an unsound economic
structure that worsened by heavy borrowing and heavy spending. In addition,
there was a drought and famine in Asia Minor from 1873-1874 and a
financial panic in Constantinople in 1873.19 These events only made existing
conditions worse for the Christian peasants in the European provinces of the
Ottoman Empire. The Christians paid heavy taxes to both landowners and
tax farmers and were often exploited for more money. 20 There was little
opportunity for justice for these peasants, so they opted for rebellion.21 This
uprising gave Disraeli his first opportunity to pursue the more active foreign
policy he believed was necessary to maintain Britain’s power and importance
on the European Continent. Therefore, as the Balkan Crisis developed,
Disraeli sought a response that was solely Britain’s rather than one dependent
on the major powers.22
The first formal reaction by any of the major European powers to the
Balkan Crisis was the Andrassy Note. Count Andrassy, the Foreign Minister
16
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for Austria-Hungary, Prince Gorchakov, the Chancellor of Russia, and Prince
Bismarck of Germany formulated a reform program for the Ottomans in an
effort to appease the rebelling Balkan states. This committee of foreign
ministers sent out the so-called Andrassy Note on December 30, 1875 to the
major European powers. The reforms called for the “abolition of tax farming,
agrarian improvements, a guarantee that provincial revenues should be spent
on provincial needs,” religious freedom for Christians in the Balkan states,
and a joint Muslim and Christian commission to oversee enforcement of all
the reforms.23 The dreikaiserbund hoped that the Andrassy Note would
produce true reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans usually did not
implement the reforms that European powers imposed on them, but the
method the Andrassy Note laid out had potential for true reform.24 Russia,
Germany, Italy, and France quickly accepted the Andrassy Note. Britain, or
rather Disraeli, hesitated. He wanted Britain’s course to be set by the British
and the British alone. Disraeli did not appreciate being left out of the
discussion of terms for the Ottomans by the dreikaiserbund.25 Now he either
had to simply follow the other powers or do nothing. Disraeli reluctantly
accepted the terms, but it did not matter anyway because the Andrassy Note
failed. Though the European powers and the Turks accepted it, the rebels in
the Balkan states did not, as they did not see the reforms actually being
achieved unless the European powers put real force behind it.26
Meanwhile, Disraeli made a couple of political moves that
strengthened Britain’s hold over India and showed the rest of Europe that
India was fully Britain’s territory. One of Disraeli’s biographers, Clive
Bigham, calls both of these actions “personal strokes” for Disraeli.27 These
are two of the events he is most remembered for in his whole political career.
The first of these moves was the purchase of shares in the Suez Canal.
Although far from carrying the majority of Britain's overall trade, the Suez
Canal was extremely important commercially and strategically for Britain.
4/5 or 80 percent of the trade through the Canal itself was British. The Suez
Canal cut the route from Britain to India down by several weeks and nearly
23
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6,000 miles. For Britain, this was important should there be more Indian
insurrections or Russia threatened their interests in India or the Far East.
Because of this, Disraeli moved toward involvement in the Canal Company
before he became Prime Minister. However, the Suez Canal Company was
French owned.28 He tried to buy out the owner, Ferdinand de Lesseps, soon
into his term as Prime Minister in order to control the company but nothing
came of it. De Lesseps was not willing to sell despite the fact that the
company was running at a loss. 29 Disraeli continued to look for a way to
involve Britain in the Canal. The Canal was too important for Britain’s trade
and defense of India to not have a solid and defendable financial interest in it.
In 1875, Egypt’s precarious financial situation was pushing the
government very close to bankruptcy. 30 The Khedive of Egypt, Isma’il
Pasha, had been spending an increasing amount of money until he could not
pay the debt of three to four million pounds that he owed in 1875. Virtually,
the only option he had left to raise the money was to sell his 144,000 shares.
The Khedive began secret negotiations with two different French companies
in attempt to sell his shares. Henry Oppenheim, a financier who was greatly
interested in Egypt, knew of the negotiations. He then told Frederick
Greenwood, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, and Greenwood let the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Derby, know of the
development.31 Disraeli wanted to act quickly because of Egypt's precarious
financial situation, as well as the interest show by French companies in
buying the share. Both the Cabinet and the Khedive were reluctant.32 The
French companies tried to raise the money in time but could not and the
French government refused to intervene even after de Lesseps requested it.33
The Khedive eventually decided that it did not make sense for him to sell to a
French company because it was less profitable for him.34 He informed the
British government that he was ready to sell the shares. Disraeli felt he
needed to act quickly so the Khedive did not change his mind. Parliament
was not sitting at the time of the negotiations so Disraeli had to procure the
money through a loan. Disraeli was a friend with the Rothschilds, a wealthy
28
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British family that was involved in banking, and so requested that their firm
put up the four million pounds. They agreed immediately and the transaction
was secured.35
On November 24, 1875, the Queen wrote in her journal that the
purchase gave Britain “complete security for India, and altogether places us
in a very safe position.”36 The Times claimed that now Britain finally had
stock in Egypt. This was somewhat of an overstatement, but it highlighted
the importance of the purchase because it gave Britain something tangible in
Egypt.37 Many European countries recognized the purchase as a masterful
stroke for British foreign policy. In fact, nearly every European country aside
from Russia congratulated the British government on the purchase.38 In a
debate over the shares purchase in Parliament, Lord George Hamilton said,
“The purchase told the world that if in the past we had ignored the advantages
of the Canal, we had amply condoned our error, and by this judicious
investment…we had formed a happy combination which would do much
towards securing a free and uninterrupted water way between this country
and India.”39 Though Disraeli did not know it at the time, the purchase he
directed led Britain’s increasing influence in the Suez and in Egypt over the
next decade.40 For the time being, major powers recognized that the Suez
was an extra layer of security for British interests in India, as well as the Suez
Canal itself.
In 1876, Disraeli made the second political move that gave Britain a
greater hold over India. Early in that year, Queen Victoria began pressuring
Disraeli to introduce a bill to create the title, Empress of India, a phrase
already used colloquially. The timing was inconvenient for Disraeli, but his
Queen placed immense pressure on him.41 Though he was reluctant to use
his political capital to pass the bill, the conferment of the title agreed with
35
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everything Disraeli believed and expressed about imperialism and the
importance of capturing the imagination of India.42 The timing of it also
lined up with the Prince of Wales’ recent trip to India. Within the context of
growing fears of Russian advance in Central Asia, Queen Victoria was more
sensitive to the fact that Tsar Alexander II was an Emperor and she was not. 43
The leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary also held Imperial titles.
Furthermore, the Queen’s daughter was soon to have an Imperial title and the
Queen, understandably, would not have appreciated her daughter outranking
her.44 Therefore, creating the title of Empress for her was an attempt to
reassert British power and authority. 45 The Queen recognized that the
Empress title reflected the status the she had over India since the Indian
Mutiny, and sent a message to the world, namely Russia, that India was off
limits.46
There were several objections to the Bill in both Houses. One
objection was that the title would only apply to India. The case was made for
the title to encompass all of the colonies with the Princes becoming the
Princes of Australia and Canada. However, this idea was quickly dropped
because there was a greater difference in relationship between Great Britain
and India than between her other colonies. The Empress title was incredibly
helpful for Britain’s presence in India.47 Many British subjects also worried
about forsaking the ancient royal title in favor of an imperial title. It seemed
un-English in many ways.48 Other monarchs had imperial titles, but English
monarchs did not. The Queen dispelled all these fears in a letter to Disraeli
on March 18 in which she said that she did not have the “slightest intention of
giving the title of Imperial Highness to any of her children, or of making any
change in the name of the Sovereign of Great Britain.”49 Disraeli explained
these intentions repeatedly to Parliament. The Queen would remain Queen
first and foremost and be Empress only in India.50 The Royal Titles Act
42
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finally passed at the end of year, giving the Queen the title of Empress of
India on the end of her name. There were celebrations around India for a full
two weeks leading up to the proclamation on the first of January, 1877.
Before the actual proclamation, Lord Lytton, the Viceroy in India, decorated
Indian chiefs with honors, increased the salaries of the chiefs and their army,
distributed food and clothing to the poor, and granted amnesty to prisoners.
Disraeli hoped that the Empress title would impress upon the Indian people
the strength of the Queen and counteract rumors about Russia extending their
authority.51 In a letter to Lady Bradford on December 28, 1876, Disraeli said
of the celebrations of Empress, “it has no doubt consolidated our empire
there.”52
While Disraeli focused on the Royal Titles Bill at home, Serbia,
Bosnia, and Herzegovina continued to rebel against the Ottoman government.
At the end of May 1876, two events occurred at the same time. When the
Balkan crisis worsened in May, the dreikaiserbund made an attempt at
another reform program like the Andrassy Note. Prince Bismarck,
Gorchakov, and Count Andrassy gathered once again to create terms for a
two-month armistice between the different sides in the uprising.53 The Berlin
Memorandum, as it was called, basically extended the Andrassy Note. The
Christians could keep their arms initially while the consuls from the various
powers oversaw the settlement of refugees and the implementation of reforms
for the Balkan states. They recognized that continued trouble in the Balkan
states was an easy way to break up their alliance. 54 Though Bismarck,
Andrassy, and Gorchakov drew up the actual document, they did consult the
British, French, and Italian ambassadors to Germany before finalizing it. All
of the ambassadors, including Britain’s Lord Odo Russell, agreed to the terms
and expected their governments to react favorably to the memorandum.55
However, Disraeli completely rejected the Memorandum. He did not like the
reforms it proposed or the fact that it was created among the dreikaiserbund
without British input.56 At this point, Disraeli felt that Britain’s rejection of
the Memorandum was the correct step in the imperial course he was taking.
51
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Britain no longer appeared to be isolationist because she was making her own
decisions rather than accepting it like all of the other powers. Britain also did
not have to intervene to be interventionist or commit to either Turkey or the
Balkan states. Furthermore, in his calculations, pushback from Britain
equaled uneasiness and weakness in the dreikaiserbund alliance.57 He did not
succeed in weakening the alliance at this point, but he certainly made an
impression on the other powers. Disraeli’s biographer, Edgar Feuchtwanger,
called the rejection of the Memorandum Disraeli’s “most high-profile
initiative” of that year.58
Immediate events justified Disraeli’s rejection of the Berlin
Memorandum. On May 30, 1876, the same day the dreikaiserbund issued a
Memorandum, a palace coup took place in Constantinople. Murad V
replaced Abdul Aziz as Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Soon after, in June,
both the Ottoman Foreign Affairs and War Ministers died at the hands of one
of the council chamber guards.59 All the powers realized they created the
Berlin Memorandum in vain. They had to give the new Sultan time to set up
his government before they could possibly impose any reforms.60 The new
Sultan promised reforms that would hopefully treat the Christians and Balkan
peoples better. Instead, Britain’s rejection of the Memorandum only
emboldened the Ottomans against adhering to any reforms. The message the
Turks received was that Britain’s interest in preserving the Ottoman Empire
came first before any genuine desire for the Turks to reform.61
Serbia declared war on the Ottomans in the early summer of 1876.
At first the declaration of war did not produce much more debate among the
powers. The declaration was essentially a formal statement of existing
circumstances. However, later in the summer, reports began to surface that
the Turks had committed atrocities against the Christians in Bulgaria, such as
arson, sodomy, rape, and torture. Soon, Britain was in an uproar over the
Bulgarian atrocities. Disraeli did not fully trust the horror stories,
particularly, the initial reports.62 In fact, it was difficult to tell what was
actually happening with the Turkish Christians. On the one hand, William
Richard Holmes, the British consul at Sarajevo, kept insisting that it really
57
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was not as terrible as it seemed. He also insisted that the Christians were not
vying for autonomy, but rather that they be treated justly under Turkish rule.
However, many news correspondents, travel journal authors, and relief
workers located in Bulgaria claimed otherwise and corroborated the story that
the Christians were being persecuted and wanted autonomy. 63 Unfortunately,
Disraeli made some distasteful comments, dismissing the atrocities as nothing
more than “coffee-house babble.”64 Gladstone even came out of retirement to
speak against Disraeli on this issue and to champion the Bulgarian Christians’
cause.65 Disraeli obstinately refused to “respond to the scare-mongering” of
the Liberals.66 He was not pro-Turk or opposed to autonomy, but he did not
see the benefit of an “emotional hostility to the Turks.”67 He cared more
about the fate of the Balkans, the impact on Turkey, and the relationship
between Russia and Britain rather than what it meant for the Christians.68
By the fall of 1876, the Ottomans routed the Serbian army and only
fought a few skirmishes. The real battle was about to begin, because the
conflict did not affect only Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, it affected nearly
all of the major European powers. Therefore, they all had opinions about the
armistice. On the Russian side, the war between the Serbs and the Ottomans
inspired a resurgence of Russian Panslavism and sympathy for Orthodox
Christians in the Balkans.69 Panslavism was a broad term that encompassed
people with many different types of programs, from the Moscow Slavic
Benevolent Society to the Slavic Ethnographical Exhibition. However, all
Panslavs sought Russian leadership of their Slavic brothers and sisters in the
Balkans. They wanted the Balkan provinces to be liberated from the
Ottomans and claimed by Russia instead.70 Tsar Alexander II did not
condone the uprising or Panslavism, but enough of the Russian consuls
located in the Balkan provinces were actually Panslavic that they
misrepresented Russia’s goals.71 Disraeli’s biographer, Robert Blake, wrote
that General Ignatyev, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, “frankly
aimed at the overthrow of Turkish power in the Balkans and at Russian
63
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seizure of the Straits.”72 Panslavism threatened other European powers like
Austria-Hungary and Britain. Disraeli tended to only see the radical Panslav
side, which clouded his view of Russian designs.73 However, it was not
Disraeli’s fault that he felt threatened by the Russian government’s perceived
Panslavism. From the outside, it was reasonable to assume that Russia would
be sympathetic to the Serbian cause. The Panslav influence seemed
overwhelming, and in many ways it was. Panslavism often influenced the
Tsar when he was surrounded by it, like at Livadia. When more clear-headed
ministers surrounded him in St. Petersburg, he was pacifist.74
On the British side, Disraeli continued the traditional policy of
maintaining the Ottoman Empire. Russia’s advances on the Ottoman Empire
threatened Britain’s interests in India in a roundabout way. Britain needed to
be able to communicate with and travel to India. Their best options were to
go overland through the Mediterranean or through the new Suez Canal.
Russian movement into Ottoman territory threatened British access to both of
those routes.75 The Bulgarian atrocities and the resurgence of Panslavism
heightened the tension between Russia and the Ottomans. This made Disraeli
nervous because a war between the two countries seemed imminent. He
needed to make sure Russia knew Britain would intervene if their interests
were threatened.76 Disraeli still considered the protection of the Ottoman
Empire against Russia to be the most important way to protect India.77
Between the fall of 1876 and the spring of 1877, a myriad of
armistice options, negotiations, and ultimatums passed between the Ottomans
and the major European powers. Overarching all the negotiations were the
opposing forces of panslavism in Russia and the need to protect Turkey on
the British side. Essentially the Turks refused everything either power
suggested. Russia and Britain continually made proposals, however, because
the Ottomans’ own terms were completely unacceptable. They wanted the
Serbian prince to pay homage to the Sultan and increase taxes on the
Serbians.78 Russia could not agree to such terms because of the consequences
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for the Serbian Christians. Britain could not agree to the terms because
Russia would not agree to them, and, if Russia was unsatisfied with the
settlement of the war, they would declare war on the Ottomans. Of course,
the Serbians would never accept the Ottomans’ terms either. In September of
1876, Britain’s Lord Derby proposed maintaining the status quo of Bosnian
and Montenegrin territories and called for the autonomy of Bosnia,
Herzegovina, and Bulgaria with the transition to be overseen by the powers. 79
All of the powers agreed to Lord Derby’s suggestions, except the Ottomans.
They countered the proposal by suggesting a long armistice with a general
reform program for the Balkans that none of the other powers believed would
occur. Most of the powers, including Britain, agreed but both Russia and
Germany hesitated.80 Britain might be able to pretend that the Ottomans
would carry out the reforms, but the Russian government could not ignore the
outcry from the Russian public to defend the Christians.
Lord Derby then proposed that the powers meet for a conference in
Constantinople. Everyone agreed, and the Constantinople Conference began
on December 12, 1876. Lord Salisbury went as Britain’s representative,
which pleased Disraeli because the two men had similar, if not identical,
ideas about the whole situation. Unlike Lord Derby, Lord Salisbury had a
healthy suspicion of the Russians, and he never let an olive branch from them
go to waste. However, he was unlike Disraeli in that he was determined to
get the Balkan Christians out from under the Ottomans as soon as possible.81
Lord Salisbury was a perfect mix between the opposing sides of Lord Derby
and Disraeli.
The Conference was to settle three main things: peace terms
between the Ottomans and Serbs, autonomy of Bosnia and Bulgaria, and the
logistics of international oversight of the terms.82 The objective was to settle
the Balkan territorial issues and Ottomans’ reform issues rather than make
sure that any of the powers got anything tangible out of the terms.83
However, the Conference was doomed to fail from the beginning. As soon as
it started, the Ottomans announced a new Grand Vizier and a new
constitution that promised new reforms and a better system. In reality, they
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were simply stalling and trying to disrupt the Conference, because they did
not want it to take place.84 As usual, the Ottomans fooled none of the powers
into thinking that they were sincere. However, there was not much the
delegates could do if the Ottoman’s Constitution was promising all of the
reforms that the Conference proposed. So the Conference ended in January
of 1877, almost as soon as it started. The Ottomans and Serbs finally made
peace but only based on the status quo rather than any territorial changes or
promised reforms.85
Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in April 1877. All of
the major European powers expected Russia to win and to eventually occupy
Constantinople. Apparently, the tension and worry led Disraeli to threaten
resignation and the Queen to threaten abdication.86 The closer Russia got to
Constantinople, the more nervous the British became. Disraeli was afraid
that the Russians would reach Constantinople faster than the British fleet
could be sent through the Dardanelles, so he suggested occupying Gallipoli.
The Cabinet rejected his suggestion and instead settled on sending a note to
Russia warning them not to go near Constantinople, the Straits, the Suez
Canal, or Egypt.87
The Ottomans effectively halted the Russians at a Bulgarian town
called Plevna in July 1877 and held them back longer than anyone expected.
This delay for the Russians gave Disraeli and his cabinet more time to
formulate a response and contingency plan in case Russia did occupy
Constantinople. Though the British threatened Russia numerous times with
intervention if the Russians advanced further, Disraeli was not confident that
they would not touch Constantinople. In October 1877, Disraeli’s cabinet
met to come up with plans in case Russia did advance towards the
Bosporus.88 Disraeli had military plans ready for a long time before anything
between Russia and the Ottomans broke out. Most of his plans were
extravagant and unfeasible, like the occupation of Gallipoli, but the fact that
he had possibilities planned, showed how much he distrusted Russia.89 At
this point in the war, Disraeli was able to convince the Cabinet to agree to
war with Russia if the Russians actually occupied Constantinople and the
84
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Straits. The Russians finally took Plevna in December 1877 and continued
their advance.
In January of 1878, the British Cabinet voted to send the British fleet
through the Dardanelles and asked Parliament for six million pounds to spend
on a potential war.91 On January 23, the British fleet sailed to
Constantinople.92 The Great Game author Peter Hopkirk summed it up
eloquently when he wrote, “…in February 1878, the Russian armies stood at
the gates of Constantinople, their age-old dream seemingly about to be
realized, only to find the British Mediterranean fleet anchored in the
Dardanelles. It was a blunt warning to the Russians to proceed no further.
War now seemed certain.”93 As an additional warning, Disraeli ordered that
British Indian troops be moved towards the Mediterranean area, specifically
Malta. Britain was trying to make it clear to the Russians that they would
defend their interests in the Mediterranean with force.94 Thankfully it did not
come to that. In fact, there were no hostile encounters between Russia and
Britain because the Russians stopped their advance just outside
Constantinople.
Tsar Alexander backed down with his army two days away from
Constantinople. The threat of war with Britain was reason enough for Tsar
Alexander to stop his advance. Instead of continuing on to Constantinople,
he made a truce with Turkey called the Treaty of San Stefano. 95 The Treaty
called for the independence of Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania, and
established Bulgaria as an autonomous principality. In addition, the Russians
required a re-working of many of the borders of the Balkan states in order to
get huge pieces of land in Anatolia.96 Everything about the new Bulgaria was
to be Russianized even though the Ottomans still nominally controlled it.
The Treaty called for Russian oversight of every aspect of the government. 97
It was wholly unacceptable to every power, particularly to Britain and the
Ottomans. Britain was afraid that Russian control of the Anatolian territory
90
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gained from the Treaty would allow them easy access to the Mediterranean,
which in turn would allow easy access to India.98 Even more than that, the
treaty gave Russia considerable power over the Ottomans with the potential
for increase over time. Disraeli made his opinion on the Treaty clear in a
speech to the House of Lords:
It is to the subjugation of Turkey, it is against an
arrangement, which practically would place at the
command of Russia, and Russia alone, that unrivalled
situation and its resources, which the European Powers
places under the government of the Porte, that we protest.99
Diplomats on every side suggested a congress in order to revise the Treaty of
San Stefano more favorably. The hope was that a congress could fix the
problems and tension without Russia and Britain going to war. Russia was
reluctant to agree to a congress but eventually relented.
Before the Congress met, Britain made two secret agreements.
Russia and Britain forged the first agreement. Lord Salisbury, who was now
the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Count Shuvalov, an
influential Russian statesman, negotiated the agreement.100 It outlined the
concessions and reservations that the two countries would voice at the main
Congress and gave a solution to most of them. The main points included a
division of Bulgaria into two different sections with two different
governments. Britain also insisted on dramatically changing the borders laid
out in the San Stefano Treaty with the specific purpose of keeping Russia
from having access to the Aegean Sea.101 Unfortunately for Britain, they had
to allow the Russians to keep some territory gained in the Asian part of the
Ottoman Empire, namely Kars and Batoum.102 Tsar Alexander assured the
British that they would not extend their territory any farther. No one in
Britain put much stock in such a promise, but there was not much more that
could be done. The agreement was signed on May 30, 1878.
The second agreement Britain conducted prior to the Congress was

98

Hopkirk, 381.
Hansard Parliamentary Debates. “Message from the Queen-Army
Reserve Forces,” HL Debate, 08 April 1878, v. 239: col. 771.
http://hansard.millibanksystems.com.
100
Blake, 644.
101
Seton-Watson, 418-419.
102
Feuchtwanger, 192.
99

33

TENOR OF OUR TIMES

Spring 2016

the Cyprus Convention with the Ottomans. The document was very short. It
addressed the threat posed by Russia if she gained Batoum, Ardahan, or Kars
in the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire and promised Britain to defend
against any Russian advance past those territories. “In order to enable
England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement,” the
Sultan agreed to give the island of Cyprus to Britain.103 Biographer George
Buckle believed that Disraeli himself chose Cyprus as the location but not
without good reason. The island was perfectly situated in the Mediterranean
to defend both the Persian Gulf and the Suez.104 Commitment to stopping
Russian aggression in the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire was a step for
Britain, but it was also completely consistent with the direction of Disraeli’s
policy since he became Prime Minister. The promise of British intervention
contained Russia and minimized the threat to India from yet another
direction. Almost as a side note, British control of Cyprus meant freedom for
the Christians there, as well as a better position to enforce reforms for
Christians all over the Ottoman Empire.105
Scholars disagree over the effect that the secret preliminary
agreements had on the effectiveness of the Congress. According to one
source, the agreements locked Britain into certain concessions that hindered
Disraeli and Lord Salisbury at the Congress.106 Authors Monypenny and
Buckle asserted that it was necessary to reach an agreement beforehand so
that there was not an intractable conflict at the Congress with potentially
disastrous results.107 In the moment, meeting with Russia beforehand was the
correct move to make. Armed with promises of concessions, both sides met,
along with all the other major European powers, at the Congress of Berlin.
The Congress of Berlin opened on June 13, 1878 and lasted for
exactly one month to “decide the fate and future of Eastern Europe.”108
Attending the Berlin Congress were three diplomats each from Germany,
Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, as well as a few
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representatives from Turkey.109 Out of all the delegates at the Berlin
Congress, Disraeli caused the greatest stir and excitement among Berliners
and the press. He interested Berliners, particularly, because he actually
traveled to Berlin himself as Prime Minister to be a part of the deliberations.
The Times reported on June 13, “Lord Beaconsfield is the centre of attraction.
His personal qualities, his past career, and his personal successes equally
commanded the interest of the public.”110 The official object of the Congress
was “to submit the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the
signatories of the Treaties of 1865 and 1871.”111 As President of the
Congress, Bismarck had the authority to decide the order of deliberation. He
recognized that the sharpest point of contention and the one that involved the
majority of the powers was the division of Bulgaria.112 In fact, the primary
difference between the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin was the
makeup of Bulgaria.113
The preliminary agreement between Russia and Britain addressed
Bulgaria and called for the division of Bulgaria into two parts, but the two
countries still disagreed over Britain’s desire for the Ottomans to have
military control of the southern half.114 The Berlin Congress deliberated
heavily over this specific issue because the Russians were unwilling to give
in. Finally, Disraeli declared Britain’s proposal for the status of the southern
province to be an ultimatum. He threatened to break up the Congress and
even had his secretary, Montagu Corry, look into getting train tickets back to
London for the very next day. Thankfully, Bismarck caught wind of
Disraeli’s plans to leave and convinced him to stay. Behind the scenes,
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Bismarck convinced the Russians of the British sincerity and intractability on
this point. The next day Disraeli was pleasantly surprised to learn Russia’s
acquiescence.115 There were a few minor details of the Bulgarian question
left, but they were settled fairly quickly.
Bulgaria was ultimately divided into three parts. The first was
Bulgaria proper, which would be an autonomous principality. All the
powers, including Britain, accepted that this part would be heavily influenced
by Russia. The second portion became Eastern Roumelia, which was to be
governed by a Christian governor and was semi-autonomous. The third and
final portion included the Macedonian lands retained by Turkey. 116 Disraeli
told Lady Chesterfield of the Bulgarian question that Britain “gained a great
victory here, the extent of which is hardly yet understood in England…”117
Disraeli won the major battle of the Congress of Berlin.

Treaty of Berlin

Treaty of San Stefano

“The Eastern Crisis,”
http://www.amitm.com/thecon/lesson8.html#The_Eastern_Crisis
(accessedDecember 14, 2015).

115

Seton-Watson, 448-449.
Jelavich, 184.
117
“To Lady Chesterfield, Berlin, June 28, 1878,” Benjamin Disraeli, The
Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford 1876-1881, vol. 2, ed.
Marquis of Zetland (NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1929), 229.
116

36

Disraeli and the Eastern Question
The next major issue involved Austria-Hungary. The AustroHungarians wanted to claim Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of their territory.
The British backed Count Andrassy’s proposal because he had been on
Britain’s side during the Bulgarian incident.118 In fact, no one particularly
opposed this point, though Russia agreed only reluctantly. 119 Other major
issues included disagreements over the borderline of Russia’s Asiatic frontier.
The main problem was a misunderstanding between Disraeli and the Russian
Count Gorchakov over what border line they were trying to move. Once the
other diplomats with them discovered the misunderstanding, they were
quickly able to come to a compromise over where the line should be. 120 The
final issue was that of Batum. Disraeli planned to argue strongly against
Russian claims to it at the Congress. However, the details of the Cyprus
Convention leaked right at the moment that Batum was being discussed. It
was embarrassing for the British and made it hard for Disraeli or Lord
Salisbury to ask for any concessions regarding Batum. They were only able
to secure Batum as a free port rather than completely block the Russians from
taking that area. Disraeli was right to worry about Russia in Batum because
eight years later, Batum became a fortified Russian base as Russians claimed
that the wording was vague.121 Even so, Britain made the correct move for
the security of their colonies in obtaining Cyprus. Once the Congress knew
all of the details, most of the diplomats praised Disraeli and Lord Salisbury
for such a “daring stroke.”122
The Treaty of Berlin was signed on July 13, 1878. At the time, most
people deemed it a major success, particularly for Disraeli and Britain. The
German Crown Princess, Victoria, wrote to her mother Queen Victoria on the
day it was signed to share that she thought that Britain’s prestige on the
continent was finally restored. The Russians had been checked and put in
their place.123 Disraeli and Lord Salisbury returned home to London to an
enthusiastic public.124 Disraeli had conquered the Eastern Question. If
nothing else, he accomplished his own goals for Britain. Disraeli’s own
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popularity and participation in the Congress turned all eyes towards Britain.
Though Bismarck presided over the Berlin Congress and directed the general
discussion, the entire Congress had been dominated by British goals and
fears. In that regard, Disraeli reminded the other powers that Britain still had
a strong, if not the strongest, say in continental and world affairs. Russian
threats and advances towards India were sufficiently checked for the time
being. Issues in Afghanistan continued to flare up, but Disraeli stopped the
Russian advance he had feared from their conflict with Turkey and the San
Stefano Treaty. While Russia gained some territory, the Treaty of Berlin
made certain that there was not enough for her to threaten the Ottomans or
Britain. Finally, the Congress of Berlin succeeded in breaking up the
dreikaiserbund. Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany did not agree with
each other enough by the end of the Congress and Eastern crisis as a whole to
justify a continued joint policy. 125 They based their alliance largely on the
problem in the Balkans, and now that the problem was “fixed” there was no
longer a need for an alliance.
For more than 500 years, Europe dealt with the problem of the
Eastern Question. The Question became especially troublesome in the 19 th
century, causing several crises. As Prime Minister in the 1870s, Benjamin
Disraeli dealt with a great crisis that was exacerbated by the deterioration of
the Ottoman Empire, Russia’s territorial advances in the Balkans and Central
Asia, as well as an alliance between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.
Disraeli successfully pursued a policy that contained the Russian threat to
India and restored Britain’s power and prestige on the European Continent.
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